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Abstract
We study the coevolution of quantum and classical strategies on weighted and directed random networks in the realm of
the prisoner’s dilemma game. During the evolution, agents can break and rewire their links with the aim of maximizing
payoffs, and they can also adjust the weights to indicate preferences, either positive or negative, towards their neighbors.
The network structure itself is thus also subject to evolution. Importantly, the directionality of links does not affect the
accumulation of payoffs nor the strategy transfers, but serves only to designate the owner of each particular link and with it
the right to adjust the link as needed. We show that quantum strategies outperform classical strategies, and that the critical
temptation to defect at which cooperative behavior can be maintained rises, if the network structure is updated frequently.
Punishing neighbors by reducing the weights of their links also plays an important role in maintaining cooperation under
adverse conditions. We find that the self-organization of the initially random network structure, driven by the evolutionary
competition between quantum and classical strategies, leads to the spontaneous emergence of small average path length
and a large clustering coefficient.
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Introduction
Evolutionary games on graphs and networks as well as
coevolutionary games have recently received significant attention
[1–4]. Nowak and May’s discovery of network reciprocity [5] has
indeed spawned a spree of activity aimed at understanding how
the interactions between us affect the evolution of cooperation.
The later has implications ranging from the Cold War to bacterial
colonies [6,7]. While there are other forms of reciprocity that one
can count on to lead to cooperation [8], network reciprocity has
received a substantial push from leaps of progress in network
science that have unfolded roughly a decade ago [9–12].
Evolutionary games have been staged on various types of complex
networks [13–27], whereby in particular the scale-free network has
been identified as an excellent host topology for cooperative
individuals [28–30], warranting the best protection against
defectors. Since the strong heterogeneity of the degree distribution
of scale-free networks was identified as a key driving force behind
flourishing cooperative states [31–35], some alternative sources of
heterogeneity were also investigated as potential promoters of
cooperation with noticeable success (see also [36]). Examples of
such approaches include the introduction of preferential selection
[37], asymmetry of connections [38], different teaching capabil-
ities [39], heterogeneous influences [40], social diversity [41] as
well as diversity of reproduction time scales [42]. Coevolutionary
games [3] have also been extensively studied, for example in the
study of the coevolution of strategy and structure [43], games on
networks subject to random or intentional rewiring procedures
[14,44–51], prompt reactions to adverse ties [52,53], games on
growing networks [54,55], and indeed many more [49,56–
65,65,66].
While classical game theory [67–69] has made an impact on a
large range of disciplines, it has also been generalized to the
quantum regime [73,74]. A new research area dubbed quantum
game theory has emerged, and has since attracted considerable
attention. Some interesting results without counterparts in classical
game theory have been reported. For example, an agent using a
quantum strategy can always defeat an opponent using a classical
strategy and increase expected payoffs in a penny flip game [74].
When the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) is quantized, it is surprising
that the dilemma in the PD can be escaped if agents are allowed to
play quantum strategies in a restricted space [73]. Later, the Battle
of the Sexes game was studied in a further quantum game model,
and a unique equilibrium for the game was found, provided agents
adopt quantum strategies [75]. Furthermore, the model for a two-
person quantum game has been extended to a n-person quantum
game [76]. Later on, evolutionary quantum games [76], evolu-
tionary stable strategies [77], quantum cooperative games [78] and
quantum repeated games [79] were also studied. More recently, a
unifying perspective on both the classical and quantum versions of
two-player games has been given by a probabilistic framework
[80]. Classically defined games have been analyzed and it has been
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found that a quantum team has an advantage over any classical
team [81]. Quantum games have also been analyzed by using
geometric algebra [82–84], and they have been implemented
using quantum computers [85–88]. For further background on
quantum games, we refer to [89,90].
It is important to note that quantum games are established on
quantum mechanics, and hence quantum effects such as
entanglement can be employed, which may give rise to results
or phenomena without classical counterparts. This is also the main
difference between a quantum and a classical game. According to
quantum game theory, a classical strategy set is only a subset of the
full quantum strategy space, and the latter can thus be used to
describe a larger variety of different phenomena. If agents can use
both quantum and classical strategies, an interesting question is
how these strategies evolve on a network. Previous research [70–
72] has shown that the evolution exhibits new features without
classical counterparts. For example, if strategies evolve on a static
network, a quantum strategy becomes the dominant strategy in the
population from the outset, when a PD game is employed.
Conversely, if only the two classical strategies of cooperation (C)
and defection (D) are considered, defectors always dominate for
sufficiently large temptations to defect. In Ref [72], the evolution
of quantum and classical strategies was studied in spatial public
goods games, where cooperators could survive even at r~0, while
in the classical regime there exists at critical finite r where
cooperators die out. These results, however, were obtained on
static networks.
In this paper, we therefore focus on the behavior of quantum
and classical strategies on an evolving network, where relationships
among agents vary over time by means of a coevolutionary
process. As is observed in societies, friendship networks consist of a
set of relationships weighted by the level of trust between friends.
Trust can increase or decrease depending on the past actions of
each member of the network. The process of making friends can
be modeled by a weighted and directed evolving network, where
agents are regarded as nodes of the network, relationships between
them as links and the degree of trust as a weight on a link.
Therefore, in this paper, the evolution of quantum and classical
strategies on a weighted and directed evolving network is
investigated. In the evolving network, the structure of the network
varies with time due to agents switching their neighbors, which is
implemented by breaking links and connecting new ones. Further,
if there are two directed links between two nodes, this means that
two agents (the nodes) are best friends and the degrees of trust (the
weights on the links) are highest. When a link is broken and
rewired to a new node, it means an agent makes a new friend, and
then the new friend assigns a degree of trust (a weight) to the
relationship (the link). Over time, the degree of trust or the weight
on a given link can increase or decrease by agents breaking and
rewiring links that belong to them. It is worth noting that an agent
cannot cut the links directed from its neighbors to itself, but it can
lower the weights on these links to punish the neighbors. Also, it
should be emphasized that the direction of a link only indicates to
whom the link belongs, but two agents are neighbors if there is a
link between them, regardless of the direction of the link, and they
can adopt strategies from one another likewise unrestricted by the
directionality of links.
The evolution of the network and the modification of weights
can be visualized in terms of a game-theoretic setting with
associated payoffs, i.e., links and weights are altered as a function
of the set of payoffs, and meanwhile agents’ total payoffs are
affected by weights too. Furthermore, an agent’s total payoff will
influence the spread of a strategy in the network. Obviously, high
total payoffs are advantageous to the wide spread of strategies.
Based on the rules of coevolution, new patterns are observed,
when quantum games and quantum strategies are involved.
Further, we discuss the coevolution in different parameters and
explain the results of the evolution of strategies and networks in
detail. It is worth noting that a quantum strategy is not a
probabilistic sum of pure classical strategies (except under special
conditions), and that it cannot be reduced to pure classical
strategies [77].
The basics of quantum games and the model with coevolution-
ary rules are presented in the Methods section, where also the
notation and other mathematical concepts are introduced. Next
we proceed with the results, in particular showing how the
probability of a structural update event influences the evolution of
quantum and classical strategies, what is the impact of the
relationship between the coevolution and the number of initial
neighbors, and what is the impact of minimizing weights. Lastly
we also investigate the statistical properties of the interaction
networks before and after the coevolution. We conclude with a
brief discussion of presented results.
Methods
Basics of Quantum Games
The Prisoner’s Dilemma, as an abstraction of many strategic
phenomena in the real world, has been widely applied in a number
of scientific fields. In this symmetric game, each agent has two
available strategies, Cooperation (C) and Defection (D). If both
agents are cooperators, then they receive Reward (R). Contrarily,
if they are both defectors, they receive Punishment (P). When one
is a cooperator and the other is a defector, the cooperator receives
Sucker (S), while the defector acquires the highest payoff,
Temptation (T ). So, the payoff matrix to the focal agent can be
written as












To be compatible with previous studies and without loss of
generality, the payoff matrix of the PD game is chosen as R~1,
T~b (1vbƒ2), P~0 and S~0, satisfying the inequalities
TwRwP§S. As is known in classical game theory, the strategy
profile (D,D) is the unique Nash Equilibrium (NE). However, the
strategy profile (C,C) is merely the best choice that is Pareto
optimal [91]. This gives rise to the dilemma.
On the other hand, if both agents are allowed to adopt quantum
strategies in a restricted space, the dilemma can be removed [73].
Next, we will introduce the model of a quantum game briefly,
which is shown in Fig. 1 [73].
Figure 1. A model of a quantum game. For details on the notation
we refer to the Methods section, in particular the subsection Basics of
Quantum Games.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0068423.g001
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In the model, at first two basis vectors fDC~0T,D ~1Tg in
Hilbert space are assigned to the possible outcomes of the classical
strategies, C~0 and D~1, respectively [73]. Assume a quantum
game starts in an initial state D00T, where two qubits belong to two
agents, say Alice and Bob. The state will be Dy0T~J^ D00T, if the
initial state is operated by a unitary operator J^ that is known to
both agents. For a 2|2 maximally entangled quantum game, the




p (I62zis62x ): ð2Þ
In the following, each agent chooses a unitary operator Y^ as a












where a,b[½{p,p, h[½0,p and then operates it on the qubit that
belongs to the agent. Finally, the state (Y^16Y^2)J^ D00T goes
through a unitary operator J^{. Before Alice and Bob forward their
qubits for the final measurement, i.e., before a projective
measurement on the basis fD0T,D1Tg is carried out, the final state is
Dyf T~J^
{(Y^16Y^2)J^ D00T: ð4Þ
Thus, the focal agent’s expected payoff can be calculated as







The Model with Coevolutionary Rules
Assume there is a weighted and directed network Gt(V ,E) with
N nodes, where V is the set of nodes, E is the set of links and t is
the time step. There are no duplicated links and self loops in the
network. Initially, a regular random network G0(V ,E) is
constructed, in which each node has kout neighbors, which
warrants that all nodes have equal chances of success [94]. Here,
kout is the outdegree of a node. Moreover, initially there are two
links between any pairs of connected nodes and the initial weight
on each link is wij~wji~1. A regular random network can be
created as follows. At first, a undirected ring with N nodes is
constructed, where each node has kout nearest neighbors. Next, we
choose two links randomly in the ring, say {eab and ecd[E}, and
switch two nodes belonging to different links to created two new
links, {eac and ebd} or {ead and ebc}. Then, we check if the
number of neighbors of each node is kout or not. If the numbers of
neighbors of all nodes are kout, then the two new links will be
retained. Otherwise, the switch operation will be canceled. The
two steps are repeated till all links in the network are rewired once.
Each node i[V in the network is occupied by an agent and its
neighbor j is any other agent such that there is a link between
them, so the set of neighbors of an agent i at a time step t can be
defined as
C t(i)~C t(i/? j)|C t(i?j)|C t(i/j)
C t(i/? j)~f j D eij[E,eji[E, j[V \ig
C t(i?j)~f j D eij[E,ejiE, j[V \ig
C t(i/j)~f j D eijE,eji[E, j[V \ig ,
8><
>: ð6Þ
where V \i means the set of nodes, V , not including the i-th
node (a complement of fig in V ) and there are two links between
the agent i and its neighbor j in C t(i/? j), also called bidirectional
links. Similarly, there is a directed link from the agent i to the
neighbor j in C t(i?j), while there is a link directed from the
neighbor j in C t(i/j) to the agent i. According to the definition,
any two agents are neighbors, only if there is a link between them,
regardless of the direction of the link. And the total number of
neighbors of the agent i is kt(i)~DC t(i)D, where D:D represents the
cardinality of a set.
Initially, each agent on the network is randomly assigned one of
two quantum strategies or two classical strategies (C and D) with
equal probability, all of which are taken from the full quantum
strategy space S^, and the initial fraction of agents using each













while two quantum strategies, Q1 and Q2, are produced by
choosing the parameters, a,b and h, in Eq. 3 randomly, before
each simulation starts. For example, at the t-th simulation,
initially, Q1~Y^ (at1,bt1,ht1), Q2~Y^ (at2,bt2,ht2).
Next, the rules of the strategy evolution and the network
evolution are introduced in detail. Strategy evolution: (i) a randomly
selected agent i plays 2|2 maximally entangled quantum games
with all its neighbors in j[C t(i), respectively, according to the
model of a quantum game (Fig. 1). The expected payoff of the
agent after playing a game with a neighbor can be calculated by












(ii) After each round, the agent i randomly chooses a neighbor
j[C t(i), and then the agent j calculates its total payoff Ft(j) in
terms of the above mentioned method. In the framework of the
replicator dynamics, the agent i compares its total payoff with the
neighbor’s and imitates the neighbor’s strategy with probability





where l is the intensity of selection and the updating rule is also
called the Fermi rule. If the agent i decides to imitate this strategy,
it will play it in the next round. It is worth noting that the direction
of a link between two agents only represents who controls this link
Coevolution of Quantum and Classical Strategies
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and agents can adopt strategies from one another likewise
unrestricted by the directionality of links. This process is called a
strategy update event.
Network evolution: After the agent updates its strategy, the
structure of the network is updated with probability pn. First,
agent i identifies the neighbors who bring payoffs that are below
the average and those with minimal weights on links, and then
puts them in a set Ut(i)~fj D Pt(Y^i,Y^j) ,P
j[C t(i)Pt(Y^i,Y^j)=kt(i), j[C t(i)g|fj D wij~wmin, j[C t(i?j)g,
where wmin represents the minimal weight. In the set, there exist
three types of links between the agent and the neighbors: (i)
bidirectional links, fC t(i/? j)\Ut(i)g; (ii) links directed from the
agent to the neighbors, fC t(i?j)\Ut(i)g; (iii) links directed from
the neighbors to the agent, fC t(i/j)\Ut(i)g. For Case (i), the
agent performs the following three steps. (a) Link broken. The
agent breaks the links that belong to it. (b) Link rewired. The
broken links are preferentially rewired to the neighbors who bring
payoffs higher than the average and where there is only one link
directed from each of the neighbors to the agent,
Wt(i)~fj D jUt(i),j[C t(i/j)g. As such, there are two links
between the agent and a neighbor in Wt(i), and the weights on the
links are upgraded to wij~wji~1. If the number of broken links is
larger than that of DWt(i)D, the other links will be rewired to the
agent’s neighbors’ neighbors at random [94], satisfying the
condition that there are no links between the chosen nodes and
the agent before rewiring. The new neighbors will randomly assign
weights wij to the new links, which are restricted to an interval
(wmin,0:9, and follow a normal distribution with
m~(wminz0:9)=2 and s
2~0:1, where m and s2 are the mean
and the variance, respectively. This distribution is applied in order
to imitate that most people in reality give half degrees of trust to
new friends, when wmin~0:1. (c) Punishment. The weights on the
links directed from the neighbors to the agent are set to wji~wmin
for punishment. In Case (i), these links remain after Step (a),
because the agent only breaks the links directed from it to the
neighbors. On the other hand, for Case (ii), the agent only needs
to do Step (a) and (b), because all links are directed from the agent
to neighbors. It is easier for Case (iii), because only Step (c) needs to
be carried out. The process of the network evolution is illustrated
in Fig. 2, which is also called a structural update event.
The entire game is iterated for a maximum number of
t~5|104 time steps and the fractions of agents with different
strategies are calculated by averaging over another 1000 time steps
after the maximum, which produces a result of evolution of
strategies vh(b)~fvh(b,1),vh(b,2),vh(b,C),vh(b,D)g, where
vh(b,:) denotes the fraction of agents with a certain strategy at a
given b. When the temptation b changes from 1 to 2,
vh(b,:),b[(1,2 represents a curve and vh(b),b[(1,2 represents a
family of curves. The statistical result Q(b),b[(1,2 is obtained by








h~1 vh(b,D)=200), b[(1,2. If strategies of all agents do not
change for 1000 consecutive time steps, it is deemed that a steady
state has been reached and the iteration ends.
Results and Discussion
In our simulations, the coevolution starts from a weighted and
directed regular random network G0(V ,E) with N~2500 nodes
that are occupied by agents using quantum and classical strategies.
Agents play games with their immediate neighbors according to
the model of a quantum game. Due to the rules of the coevolution
involved, agents can break and rewire their own links, which leads
the network to become an evolving network Gt(V ,E). During the
coevolution, the intensity of selection is set at l~0:05 throughout
the paper and the weight for punishment is set at wmin~0:1, if not
otherwise explicitly stated. Later, the coevolution of strategies and
networks over different parameters is investigated.
In this section, how the probability of a structural update event
occurring influences the evolution of quantum and classical
strategies is studied first, and then the results are explained in
detail. Fig. 3 exhibits the statistical results of the evolution of four
strategies on an evolving network with different probabilities pn.
Because quantum strategies are taken from a very large space S^ by
choosing the parameters, a,b and h at random, before each
simulation starts, the final result Q(b) is obtained statistically in
order to reduce randomness. In the result of each simulation
vh(b),b[½1,2 (like Fig. 3), for the curves corresponding to the
quantum strategies, the quantum strategy that produces the
topmost curve is defined as Q1, the second curve as Q2, and so on.
Finally, the statistical result Q(b),b[(1,2 can be obtained in terms
Figure 2. Illustration of the network evolution. The left panel represents the status of the network before the network evolution, in which the
focal agent i (in red) on the network with kout~3 intends to break two links (in dash lines) due to payoffs less than the average. The right panel is the
status of the network after the network evolution, where the focal agent preferentially rewires one of the broken links to a neighbor j (in blue) who
brings a payoff greater than the average and upgrades the weights to wij~wji~1. However, the weight on the remaining link between the agent i
and g is set at wgi~wmin by the agent i for punishment. Then, it chooses a neighbor’s neighbor k (in green) at random and rewires the other link to
the neighbor k. Meanwhile, the neighbor k assigns a weight wik[(wmin,0:9 randomly to the new link.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0068423.g002
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of the statistical method described in the last of the Methods
section.
In Fig. 3, there exists a curve that is higher than others, when
the coevolution comes to an end, which means that the strategy is
played by most of agents in the population and it is also a
dominant strategy in the population. When the strategies evolve
on a static network, namely pn~0, a quantum strategy can be a
dominant strategy from the outset. Furthermore, the fraction of
agents using the dominant strategy rises slightly with the increase
of the temptation b. However, once the network evolution is
involved, new patterns emerge in the evolution of strategies. As is
shown in Fig. 3 (b)–(d), even if the probability of a structural
update event pn is low, the strategy, Cooperation, dominates in the
population when b is small. However, as b increases, the fractions
of agents using quantum strategies in the population exceed that of
cooperators gradually, and finally a quantum strategy becomes the
dominant strategy. Moreover, the fraction of defectors also
increases a little at the same time.
When an agent adopts a quantum strategy Q[fS^g\fC,Dg
against its neighbor who uses a strategy X[S^, according to Eq. 5,
its expected payoff is restricted to an interval (0,b), i.e., P(Q,X ) or
P(X ,Q)[(0,b). Further, based on the statistical analysis of payoffs,
most payoffs of agents using the strategy Q are less than 1,P(Q,X )
or P(X ,Q)[(0,1), when b is less than the critical value. In terms of
the rules of the network evolution, if the focal agent’s payoff, after
a game with a neighbor, is less than the average, the link directed
from the focal agent to the neighbor will be broken. In order to
observe the behavior of different pairs of agents, we list the focal
agent’s payoffs and possible operations in Table 1 according to the
statistical analysis, before b reaches the critical value. Here, a
C?C pair means two agents connected by a link both adopt the
strategy C, a D?D pair means both adopt the strategy D, and so
on. From Table 1, it can be found that D?D and C?D pairs are
surely broken, because the focal agent’s payoff is zero, and other
pairs will be broken if the received payoffs are less than the average
or the weights of the links are wij~wmin. On the contrary, C?C
pairs always bring 1 for each agent, while the payoff 1 is greater
than the average easily at a small b, so that many C?C pairs can
be preserved. Furthermore, when rewiring begins, it is more likely
that agents preferentially rewire the broken links to the cooper-
Figure 3. The evolution of strategies as a function of b on a weighted and directed evolving network for different pn. (a) pn~0. (b)
pn~0:2. (c) pn~0:5. (d) pn~1. (a)–(d) exhibit the fractions of agents using two quantum strategies (Q1 and Q2) and two classical strategies (C and D)
in the population after the coevolution, when kout~10, wmin~0:1 and different probabilities of a structural update event are adopted.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0068423.g003
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ators in the neighborhood, because they bring payoffs greater than
the average. As such, the number of C?C pairs will be increased
further. Hence, cooperators can accumulate higher payoffs and
the strategy C can spread widely in the population when b is small.
On the other hand, as the temptation b rises, the expected
payoffs of agents adopting a quantum strategy Q rise at the same
time. Particularly, after b is greater than the critical value, more
and more agents using quantum strategies receive payoffs greater
than 1, P(Q,X ) or P(X ,Q)[(1,b). Thereafter, the probability of
C?C pairs to be broken gradually becomes higher than that of
Q?X and X?Q pairs, because cooperators’ payoffs are now
often less than the average. Thus, agents using quantum strategies
can accumulate higher payoffs, which leads quantum strategies to
prevail in the population. Consequently, a quantum strategy
becomes the dominant strategy. Note that a defector in a D?C
pair always acquires the highest payoff. When b is significantly
greater than 1, the defector’s total payoff is thus likely very high.
Therefore, the strategy D can also be imitated by some myopic
agents, but the fraction of defectors rises only a little, because
D?C pairs will be broken in the next round, since the opponent
(cooperator) minimizes the weight on the D?C link as
punishment in this round.
If the probability of a structural update event, pn, becomes
higher, the strategy C will be dominant in the population in a
larger range of b. When the time scale for the network evolution is
much faster than that for the strategy evolution, say pn~1, the
critical value of b can be increased up to b~1:75. As analyzed
above, many C?C pairs are preserved when b is small. If the
structure of the network is updated faster, more C?C pairs will be
preserved and created in terms of the rules of the network
evolution. Therefore, the fraction of cooperators in the population
is higher at a high probability pn than that at a low probability.
When b rises further, the number of Q?X and X?Q pairs in the
population is increased at the same time, but the rate of C?C
pairs produced is still high, because of the high probability of a
structural update event. This slows the spread of quantum
strategies, while the strategy C is dominant in the population at
a larger critical value of b.
In summary, the higher the probability of a structural update
event, the greater the critical value of b corresponding to the
domination of cooperators in the population and the higher the
fraction of cooperators. However, in reality, it is often observed
that people change their strategies faster than their relationships
between friends, i.e., the time scale for the strategy update is faster
than that for the structural changes, so in the rest of the paper, the
probability of the network evolution pn is set at 0.2.
Next, the relationship between the evolution of strategies and
the number of neighbors is discussed, and subsequently the impact
of punishment on the coevolution of the network structure is
investigated. When an initial network is constructed, the number
of neighbors of an agent depends on the parameter kout, which
determines the connectedness of the random network. Therefore,
we increase the number of agents’ initial neighbors from kout~10
to kout~20 and 30, in order to measure the effects of higher
connectedness on the strategy evolution. Comparing them with
the result obtained at kout~10 and pn~0:2, we can see that the
critical value of b is similar and the fraction of cooperators drops
only slightly. It can be inferred that if the number of initial
neighbors of agents is equal, i.e., agents have equal chances of
success, the results of the coevolution are similar.
On the other hand, according to the rules of the network
evolution, an agent can break and rewire the links directed from it
to the neighbors, if the received payoffs from neighbors are less
than the average. On the contrary, if the link between them is
directed from the neighbor to the agent, the agent can only
minimize the weight on the link in order to punish the neighbor
and reduce the neighbor’s total payoff. Thus, the link with a
minimal weight wmin will be broken by the neighbor in the next
round, because its payoff is less than the average. In the previous
subsection, the minimum of a weight for punishment is wmin~0.1.
If the minimum is increased, i.e., the intensity of punishment is
reduced, the evolution of strategies and the network will be
influenced. Meanwhile, the mean of the normal distribution is
increased due to m~(wminz0:9)=2. When wmin~0:3 and 0.5, the
results depicting the evolution of strategies are shown in Fig. 4.
From Fig. 4, it can be found that with the decrease of the
intensity of punishment, the critical value of b drops significantly
from b~1:25 (wmin~0:1) to b~1:1 (wmin~0:5). In other words, a
quantum strategy is dominant in the population at a smaller b,
while the fraction of cooperators is reduced at the same time. As is
analyzed above, before the critical value of b, the punishment
often occurs among C/D and Q/X pairs, because the focal
agent acquires payoffs less than the average. The punishment
causes the agents using quantum strategies cannot accumulate
high payoffs and prevents quantum strategies from spreading in
the population. However, when wmin is increased, the intensity of
punishment decreases, so that agents adopting quantum strategies
can collect high payoffs at a smaller b. Consequently, a quantum
strategy becomes the dominant strategy in the population earlier.
As discussed above, the strategy evolution and the network
evolution interact with each other. Finally, we thus investigate the
statistical features of the network for different parameters, after the
coevolution of strategies and the network structure comes to an
end. The clustering coefficient and the average path length are
most often used to describe statistical features of network topology.
Hence, we calculate these quantities before and after the
coevolution as representative measures of the network structure.
The clustering coefficient is a measure of degree to which nodes in
a network tend to cluster together. In this paper, the local






Table 1. The focal agents’ possible operations on different
pairs according to the statistical analysis of payoffs, before the
critical value of b.
Pairs Payoffs Operations
C?C P(C,C)~1wAverage Preserved
C?D P(C,D)~0vAverage Broken and Rewired
C?Q Mostly P(C,Q)vAverage Mostly Broken and Rewired
D?C P(D,C)~bwAverage Preserved (this round),
Broken and Rewired (next round)
D?D P(D,D)~0vAverage Broken and Rewired
D?Q Mostly P(D,Q)vAverage Mostly Broken and Rewired
Q?C Mostly P(Q,C)vAverage Mostly Broken and Rewired
Q?D Mostly P(Q,D)vAverage Mostly Broken and Rewired
Q?Q Mostly P(Q,Q)vAverage Mostly Broken and Rewired
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0068423.t001
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Here, C(i) is the clustering coefficient of the node i, while the
clustering coefficient of the network is the average of clustering
coefficients of all nodes, Ct~1=N
PN
i~1 C(i). The average path
length is the average of the shortest paths for all pairs of nodes in a








where d(i,j) denotes the shortest distance between nodes i and j.
Initially, the evolution starts on a regular random graph, whose
clustering coefficient C0 and average path length L0 both are
small. After the model is iterated for 5|104 times, the structure of
the network is changed largely, so the clustering coefficient Ct and
average path length Lt of the network are calculated again, which
are listed in Table 2. The clustering coefficient Ct and average
path length Lt in Table 2 corresponding to different pn and kout
are the averages of many Ct and Lt that are obtained from
different independent initial conditions, respectively. From
Table 2, it can be found that the clustering coefficient Ct rises
considerably compared to C0. It is even 20 times greater than C0
in the case of kout~10. On the contrary, with the increase of kout,
the growth rate of Ct drops, but it is still greater than C0. If the
probability of a structural update event rises from 0.2 to 1, while
kout is a constant, the clustering coefficient Ct will rise slightly with
it. On the other hand, the average path length Lt, after the
coevolution, is not very different from the initial average path
length L0. By further observation, it can be seen that the average
path length Lt is similar, when the probability of a structural
update event rises, whereas it decreases with the increase of kout.
Summing up, after the network evolves according to the rules of
the network evolution, a large clustering coefficient and small
average path length emerge in the network, which are properties
that are frequently referred to as small-world properties. This is
because in our coevolutionary model, the rules concerning the
evolution of the network structure allow agents to break the links
that belong to them, and then to rewire these links to neighbors’
neighbors at random. This rewiring operation, while keeping the
average path length small, increases the number of links among
agents’ neighbors, which is the main reason for the emergence of
the relatively large (compared to that of a random network)
clustering coefficient. In addition, the large clustering coefficient
can also be interpreted as emerging because of the tendency of
each agent to organize and sustain cohesive clusters of reciprocal
trust.
Lastly, we also investigate the degree distribution of networks,
which is also an important statistical feature. In this paper, we
focus on the indegree distributions of directed networks because
the outdegree is fixed, which is defined to be the fraction of nodes
in the network with indegree kin, namely, P(kin)~nk=N, where nk
is the number of nodes with indegree kin. Further, among the
nodes with the same strategy in the network, we study the indegree
distribution under a strategy in order to find possible correlations
between the indegree distributions and strategies. The indegree
distribution under a strategy is defined as Ps(kin)~nks=N , where
nks represents the number of nodes with indegree kin and where
these nodes use the same strategy. Figure 5 shows the indegree
distributions at different b, which are the statistical averages over
200 independent realizations with different initial conditions.
Figure 4. The evolution of strategies as a function of b on a weighted and directed evolving network for different intensity of
punishment, wmin. (a) wmin~0:3. (b) wmin~0:5. (a)–(b) exhibit the fractions of agents using two quantum strategies (Q1 and Q2) and two classical
strategies (C and D) in the population after the coevolution, when kout~10, pn~0:2 and different intensity of punishment, wmin, are adopted,
respectively.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0068423.g004
Table 2. Comparison of statistical features of networks
before and after coevolution.
pn kout C0 Ct L0 Lt
0.2 10 0.0030 0.0637 3.5861 3.7422
0.5 10 0.0030 0.0642 3.5826 3.7485
1.0 10 0.0031 0.0658 3.5833 3.7468
0.2 20 0.0071 0.0392 2.9725 2.9712
0.2 30 0.0111 0.0346 2.6936 2.7006
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0068423.t002
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Comparing the indegree distributions of networks P(kin) at
different b, we can see that the indegrees of most nodes (19%) in
networks are zero or one at b~1:025, while at b~2, the indegrees
of 12% of nodes are five. Further, observing the indegree
distributions under different strategies Ps(kin), it can be found
that when b is small, nodes with larger indegrees are those using
strategies C and Q1. On the contrary, at b~2, they are those with
strategies Q1 and D, and the nodes with the largest indegrees are
quantum strategists. As we have analyzed above, the strategy C
and the strategy Q1 dominate in the population at b~1:025 and
b~2 respectively, which indicates that most nodes in the network
adopt C at b~1:025 or Q1 at b~2. During the network evolution,
nodes with these strategies thus have a higher chance to be
connected by other nodes, which directly leads to the fact that
these are also the nodes with the largest indegees, as can be
inferred from Fig. 5.
Conclusions
We have proposed and studied a model with coevolutionary
rules, which uses an evolving network to represent the relation-
ships among agents. Based on the model, the evolution of
quantum and classical strategies on an evolving network is
investigated. The coevolution starts on a regular random network,
in which the number of each agent’s neighbors is equal and the
weights on links are one. The same number of neighbors
guarantees each agent has the same ability to ‘‘make friends’’,
while the direction of a link indicates to whom the link belongs, but
agents can adopt strategies from one another likewise unrestricted
by the directionality of links.
If strategies evolve on a static network, a quantum strategy
becomes the dominant strategy in the population from the outset.
However, when the network evolution is involved, even if the
probability of a structural update event pn is low, cooperators are
dominant in the population instead of agents using quantum
strategies when b is small. As the probability pn rises, cooperators
prevail in a larger range of b. But, finally, a quantum strategy
defeats the classical strategies and becomes the dominant strategy
in the population. When the probability of the network evolution
remains constant, similar results of the coevolution are obtained,
even if initially the number of neighbors of each agent is increased.
On the other hand, if the intensity of punishment is reduced by
increasing wmin, a quantum strategy can dominate in the
population at a smaller b.
After the coevolution ends, the structure of the network is
changed largely due to links being broken and rewired. By
analyzing the statistical features of the network before and after the
coevolution, we can find that the average path length increases
slightly, but the clustering coefficient increases significantly after
the coevolution, in particular it increases about 20 times at
kout~10 compared to that before the evolution. The growth rate
of the clustering coefficient decreases with the increase of kout. It
can be concluded that small world properties, small average path
length and a large clustering coefficient, emerge spontaneously in
the network after the coevolution. Comparing the indegree
distributions of networks under different strategies Ps(kin), it can
be found that at different b, nodes with the larger indegrees are
cooperators and quantum strategists, respectively.
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